The impact of property rights on economic growth is examined using indicators provided by country risk evaluators to potential foreign investors. Indicators include evaluations of contract enforceability and risk of expropriation. Using these variables, property rights are found to have a greater impact on investment and growth than has previously been found for proxies such…
Economics and Politics Template
Write in a clean editor, then format for Economics and Politics in one click — DocuGuru applies the official Wiley template with author–year references and exports a submission-ready PDF plus the editable LaTeX source. Free to start.
About the Economics and Politics format
Economics and Politics is a peer-reviewed journal published by Wiley, covering Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth, Fiscal Policies and Political Economy, Electoral Systems and Political Participation.
| Publisher | Wiley |
|---|---|
| Reference style | Author–year (Chicago) Author–year — (Smith, 2023) in the text Smith, Ada, Ben Jones, and Cara Lee. 2023. "A Representative Article Title." Economics and Politics 12 (3): 45–58.
Formats any DOI in Economics and Politics style. No sign-up. |
| Publishes research in | Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Electoral Systems and Political Participation Global trade and economics Local Government Finance and Decentralization |
| ISSN | 0954-1985 |
| Citation impact (2-yr) | 2.25 |
| h-index | 78 |
| i10-index | 374 |
| Total citations | 34,517 |
| Article processing charge | $2,940 |
| Top institutions publishing here | Columbia University |
| Journal website | onlinelibrary.wiley.com |
| You get | A submission-ready PDF and the editable LaTeX source — ready to submit. |
Papers published in Economics and Politics per year
Citation impact of Economics and Politics by publication year
Citations each year’s papers have accumulated so far — the most recent years are still building up.
Most-cited papers in Economics and Politics
A good reputation can be an effective bond for honest behavior in a community of traders if members of the community know how others have behaved in the past – even if any particular pair of traders meets only infrequently. In a large community, it would be impossibly costly for traders to be perfectly informed…
This article forges an explicit link between an objective measure of political constraints and variation in cross‐national growth rates. It derives a new measure of political constraints from a simple spatial model of political interaction that incorporates information on the number of independent branches of government with veto power and the distribution of preferences across…
Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share…
A rent or transfer is politically contestable when policy decisions are subject to influence by potential beneficiaries and losers. This paper studies contestablility of rents and transfers when contenders place different valuations on the politically allocated prize. Asymmetric valuation inhibits participation by low‐valuation contenders. The model explains the phenomena of small numbers of active participants…