It is argued that if we take grounding to be univocal, then there is a serious tension between truth-grounding and one commonly assumed structural principle for grounding, namely transitivity. The primary claim of the article is that truth-grounding cannot be transitive. Accordingly, it is either the case that grounding is not transitive or that truth-grounding…
Thought A Journal of Philosophy Template
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About the Thought A Journal of Philosophy format
Thought A Journal of Philosophy is a peer-reviewed journal published by Wiley, covering Philosophy and Theoretical Science, Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics, Philosophy and History of Science.
| Publisher | Wiley |
|---|---|
| Reference style | Author–year (Chicago) Author–year — (Smith, 2023) in the text Smith, Ada, Ben Jones, and Cara Lee. 2023. "A Representative Article Title." Thought A Journal of Philosophy 12 (3): 45–58.
Formats any DOI in Thought A Journal of Philosophy style. No sign-up. |
| Publishes research in | Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and History of Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge Free Will and Agency |
| ISSN | 2161-2234 |
| Citation impact (2-yr) | 0.04 |
| h-index | 31 |
| i10-index | 120 |
| Total citations | 4,041 |
| Top institutions publishing here | Universitat de Barcelona |
| Journal website | onlinelibrary.wiley.com |
| You get | A submission-ready PDF and the editable LaTeX source — ready to submit. |
Papers published in Thought A Journal of Philosophy per year
Citation impact of Thought A Journal of Philosophy by publication year
Citations each year’s papers have accumulated so far — the most recent years are still building up.
Most-cited papers in Thought A Journal of Philosophy
Recently several philosophers have argued that racial, gender, and other social generic generalizations should be avoided given their propensity to promote essentialist thinking, obscure the social nature of categories, and contribute to oppression. Here I argue that a general prohibition against social generics goes too far. Given that the truth of many generics require regularities…
Researchers recently demonstrated a strong direct relationship between judgments about what a person knows (“knowledge judgments”) and judgments about how a person should act (“actionability judgments”). But it remains unknown whether actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments, or knowledge judgments cause actionability judgments. This paper uses causal modeling to help answer this question. Across two experiments,…
According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show…
William Roche and Elliott Sober argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant. This conclusion is surprising since it conflicts with a plausible assumption—the fact that a hypothesis best explains a given set of data is evidence that the hypothesis is true. We argue that Roche and Sober’s screening-off argument fails to account for a key aspect…