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Mind & Language is a peer-reviewed journal published by Wiley, covering Philosophy and Theoretical Science, Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics, Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation.
| Publisher | Wiley |
|---|---|
| Reference style | Author–year (Chicago) Author–year — (Smith, 2023) in the text Smith, Ada, Ben Jones, and Cara Lee. 2023. "A Representative Article Title." Mind & Language 12 (3): 45–58.
Formats any DOI in Mind & Language style. No sign-up. |
| Publishes research in | Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation Child and Animal Learning Development Language, Metaphor, and Cognition |
| ISSN | 0268-1064 |
| Citation impact (2-yr) | 1.37 |
| h-index | 137 |
| i10-index | 771 |
| Total citations | 71,573 |
| Article processing charge | $3,760 |
| Top institutions publishing here | University College London |
| Journal website | onlinelibrary.wiley.com |
| You get | A submission-ready PDF and the editable LaTeX source — ready to submit. |
Citations each year’s papers have accumulated so far — the most recent years are still building up.
Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which…
The central problem for pragmatics is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker’s meaning. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning is bridged. This paper defends the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind‐reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions. We argue,…
