Abstract The climate system is an angry beast and we are poking it with sticks † . A critical issue in climate change economics is the specification of the so‐called “damages function” and its interaction with the unknown uncertainty of catastrophic outcomes. This paper asks how much we might be misled by our economic assessment…
Journal of Public Economic Theory Template
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About the Journal of Public Economic Theory format
Journal of Public Economic Theory is a peer-reviewed journal published by Wiley, covering Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth, Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies, Economic theories and models.
| Publisher | Wiley |
|---|---|
| Reference style | Author–year (Chicago) Author–year — (Smith, 2023) in the text Smith, Ada, Ben Jones, and Cara Lee. 2023. "A Representative Article Title." Journal of Public Economic Theory 12 (3): 45–58.
Formats any DOI in Journal of Public Economic Theory style. No sign-up. |
| Publishes research in | Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Economic theories and models Corporate Taxation and Avoidance Climate Change Policy and Economics |
| ISSN | 1097-3923 |
| Citation impact (2-yr) | 0.69 |
| h-index | 53 |
| i10-index | 505 |
| Total citations | 18,217 |
| Article processing charge | $3,040 |
| Top institutions publishing here | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique |
| Journal website | onlinelibrary.wiley.com |
| You get | A submission-ready PDF and the editable LaTeX source — ready to submit. |
Papers published in Journal of Public Economic Theory per year
Citation impact of Journal of Public Economic Theory by publication year
Citations each year’s papers have accumulated so far — the most recent years are still building up.
Most-cited papers in Journal of Public Economic Theory
Abstract We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be…
Abstract We build on the existing literature in public‐private partnerships (PPP) to analyze the main incentive issues in PPPs and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk‐averse firm chooses noncontractible efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We first…
Why do charities often begin new capital fund drives by announcing a large contribution by a single wealthy donor? This paper explores the possibility that such “leadership giving” provides a signal to all other givers that the charity is of high quality. The dilemma is that if the lead giver can deceive others to believe…
Tax competition between two countries is considered in a trade–and–location setting with differentiated products and monopolistic competition. There are two groups of workers, mobile ones and immobile ones. Taxes are used for producing a public good. It is shown that an equilibrium with mobile workers dispersed across countries is destabilized by increased taxes on these…