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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation is a peer-reviewed journal published by ACM, covering Auction Theory and Applications, Game Theory and Voting Systems, Game Theory and Applications. Over its lifetime it has published 298 papers, which have received 4,223 citations.
| Publisher | ACM |
|---|---|
| Reference style | Numbered (ACM) Numbered — [1], [2] in the text [1] Ada Smith, Ben Jones, and Cara Lee. 2023. A representative article title. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 12, 3, Article 45 (2023).
Formats any DOI in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation style. No sign-up. |
| Publishes research in | Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Optimization and Search Problems |
| ISSN | 2167-8375 |
| Citation impact (2-yr) | 0.95 |
| h-index | 31 |
| i10-index | 103 |
| Top institutions publishing here | Microsoft Research (United Kingdom) |
| Journal website | dl.acm.org |
| You get | A submission-ready PDF and the editable LaTeX source — ready to submit. |
Citations each year’s papers have accumulated so far — the most recent years are still building up.
We study binary opinion dynamics in a social network with stubborn agents who influence others but do not change their opinions. We focus on a generalization of the classical voter model by introducing nodes (stubborn agents) that have a fixed state. We show that the presence of stubborn agents with opposing opinions precludes convergence to…
Cloud providers possessing large quantities of spare capacity must either incentivize clients to purchase it or suffer losses. Amazon is the first cloud provider to address this challenge, by allowing clients to bid on spare capacity and by granting resources to bidders while their bids exceed a periodically changing spot price. Amazon publicizes the spot…
The maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution—which selects an allocation that maximizes the product of utilities—is known to provide outstanding fairness guarantees when allocating divisible goods. And while it seems to lose its luster when applied to indivisible goods, we show that, in fact, the MNW solution is strikingly fair even in that setting. In particular,…
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot be applied efficiently. Recent years have seen the design of various truthful approximation mechanisms that rely on payments. In this article, we advocate the reconsideration of highly structured optimization problems in the context…
We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof mechanisms…
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