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International Game Theory Review is a peer-reviewed journal published by World Scientific, covering Game Theory and Applications, Game Theory and Voting Systems, Economic theories and models.
| Publisher | World Scientific |
|---|---|
| Reference style | Superscript numbered (World Scientific) Superscript — small raised numerals in the text 1. Smith, A., Jones, B. & Lee, C. A representative article title. International Game Theory Review 12, 45–58 (2023).
Formats any DOI in the closest standard style — International Game Theory Review has no published style definition, so this is an approximation. No sign-up. |
| Publishes research in | Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models Auction Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies |
| ISSN | 0219-1989 |
| Citation impact (2-yr) | 0.69 |
| h-index | 36 |
| i10-index | 183 |
| Total citations | 7,019 |
| Top institutions publishing here | St Petersburg University |
| Journal website | www.worldscinet.com |
| You get | A submission-ready PDF and the editable LaTeX source — ready to submit. |
Citations each year’s papers have accumulated so far — the most recent years are still building up.
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a…
This paper explores the way in which assortative matching can maintain cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics. If encounters are random, then in Prisoner's Dilemma games, defectors necessarily get higher payoffs than cooperators and thus will eventually prevail. But if matching is assortative, the cost of cooperating may be repaid by higher probabilities of playing against…
This paper describes the relationship between two different binary choice social interaction models. The Brock and Durlauf (2001) model is essentially a static Nash equilibrium model with random utility preferences. In the Blume (2003) model is a population game model similar to Blume (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). We show that…
This paper provides an answer to the question who should, if any, lead a marketing channel? We consider a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer where each player controls his advertising rate and margin. Supposing that advertising has a carry over effect on demand, we adopt a dynamic model. Nash and Stackelberg equilibria…
Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic…
