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Philosophia Mathematica is a peer-reviewed journal published by Oxford University Press, covering Philosophy and Theoretical Science, History and Theory of Mathematics, Philosophy and History of Science.
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
|---|---|
| Reference style | Author–year (OUP) Author–year — (Smith, 2023) in the text Smith, A., Jones, B. and Lee, C. (2023) 'A representative article title', Philosophia Mathematica, 12(3), pp. 45–58.
Formats any DOI in the closest standard style — Philosophia Mathematica has no published style definition, so this is an approximation. No sign-up. |
| Publishes research in | Philosophy and Theoretical Science History and Theory of Mathematics Philosophy and History of Science Mathematical and Theoretical Analysis Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms |
| ISSN | 0031-8019 |
| Citation impact (2-yr) | 0.73 |
| h-index | 50 |
| i10-index | 230 |
| Total citations | 9,980 |
| Article processing charge | $4,151 |
| Top institutions publishing here | The Ohio State University |
| Journal website | academic.oup.com |
| You get | A submission-ready PDF and the editable LaTeX source — ready to submit. |
Citations each year’s papers have accumulated so far — the most recent years are still building up.
Ordinary mathematical proofs—to be distinguished from formal derivations—are the locus of mathematical knowledge. Their epistemic content goes way beyond what is summarised in the form of theorems. Objections are raised against the formalist thesis that every mainstream informal proof can be formalised in some first-order formal system. Foundationalism is at the heart of Hilbert's program…
According to realist structuralism, mathematical objects are places in abstract structures. We argue that in spite of its many attractions, realist structuralism must be rejected. For, first, mathematical structures typically contain intra-structurally indiscernible places. Second, any account of place-identity available to the realist structuralist entails that intra-structurally indiscernible places are identical. Since for her mathematical…
David Malament argued that Hartry Field's nominalisation program is unlikely to be able to deal with non-space-time theories such as phase-space theories. We give a specific example of such a phase-space theory and argue that this presentation of the theory delivers explanations that are not available in the classical presentation of the theory. This suggests…
In discussions about whether the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is compatible with structuralist ontologies of mathematics, it is usually assumed that individual objects are subject to criteria of identity which somehow account for the identity of the individuals. Much of this debate concerns structures that admit of non-trivial automorphisms. We consider cases from…
