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Journal of Competition Law & Economics is a peer-reviewed journal published by Oxford University Press, covering Merger and Competition Analysis, Digital Platforms and Economics, Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing.
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
|---|---|
| Reference style | Author–year (OUP) Author–year — (Smith, 2023) in the text Smith, A., Jones, B. and Lee, C. (2023) 'A representative article title', Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 12(3), pp. 45–58.
Formats any DOI in the closest standard style — Journal of Competition Law & Economics has no published style definition, so this is an approximation. No sign-up. |
| Publishes research in | Merger and Competition Analysis Digital Platforms and Economics Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems ICT Impact and Policies |
| ISSN | 1744-6414 |
| Citation impact (2-yr) | 0.91 |
| h-index | 45 |
| i10-index | 217 |
| Total citations | 8,460 |
| Article processing charge | $3,708 |
| Top institutions publishing here | Tilburg University |
| Journal website | jcle.oxfordjournals.org |
| You get | A submission-ready PDF and the editable LaTeX source — ready to submit. |
Citations each year’s papers have accumulated so far — the most recent years are still building up.
Drawing from the economics of two-sided markets, we provide suggestions for the definition of the relevant market in cases involving two-sided platforms, such as media outlets, online intermediaries, payment cards companies, and auction houses. We also discuss when a one-sided approach may be harmless and when instead it can potentially lead to a wrong decision.…
After arguing that collusion by software programs which choose pricing rules without any human intervention is not a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the paper offers a path toward making collusion by autonomous artificial agents unlawful.
Abstract The GDPR is the Magna Carta of data protection, the importance of which cannot be overstated. Yet, as this article shows, the price of data protection through the GDPR is much higher than previously recognized. The GDPR creates two main harmful effects on competition and innovation: it limits competition in data markets, creating more…
European competition laws condemn as ‘exploitative abuses’ the pricing policies of dominant firms that may result in a direct loss of consumer welfare. Article 82(a) of the EC Treaty, for example, expressly states that imposing ‘unfair’ prices on consumers by dominant suppliers constitutes an abuse. Several firms have been found to abuse their dominant positions…
Abstract This paper discusses whether self-learning price-setting algorithms can coordinate their pricing behavior to achieve a collusive outcome that maximizes the joint profits of the firms using them. Although legal scholars have generally assumed that algorithmic collusion is not only possible but also exceptionally easy, computer scientists examining cooperation between algorithms as well as economists…
